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Introduction
Many researchers have aimed to clarify the role of our con-
scious intention to act in voluntary action initiation. Libet 
et al. (1983) were among the first to use neuroscientific 
methods to investigate the nature and temporal order of the 
processes of mind that produce the experience of will and 
those that produce the action. They found that the neural 
preparatory processes for action (i.e. readiness potential) 
preceded the act by about 550 ms, whereas the onset of the 
intention to act was reported around 200 ms prior to action. 
In other words, the neural preparation for action preceded 
the conscious intention to act by about 350 ms. According 
to Libet et al., this suggests that the brain starts preparing 
an act before it is intended consciously by a person. If this 
is true, it could (and has been taken to) mean that our con-
scious intention to act does not play a causal role in action 
initiation (Libet et al. 1983; Filevich et al. 2013; Soon et al. 
2008).
The results of Libet et al. (1983) have been replicated 
several times (Haggard and Eimer 1999; Keller and Heck-
hausen 1990; Trevena and Miller 2002; Verbaarschot et al. 
2015), and their experimental design has been widely 
applied (Bai et al. 2011; Bode et al. 2011; Filevich et al. 
2013; Soon et al. 2008). In these Libet-type experiments, 
the onset of an intention to act is typically measured 
through a self-initiated report by the participant. Often, the 
participant is instructed to watch some variant of a clock 
and remember its spatial configuration at the time they 
first feel their intention to act. The remembered configu-
ration is reported after the performance of each voluntary 
movement.
To the best of our knowledge, Matsuhashi and Hallet 
(2008) are the only ones to have used a different approach 
to measure the onset of an intention to act. Instead of 
Abstract An intention to act has different onsets when it 
is measured in different ways. When participants provide 
a self-initiated report on the onset of their awareness of 
intending to act, the report occurs around 150 ms prior to 
action. However, when the same participants are repeatedly 
asked about their awareness of intending at different points 
in time, the onset of intending is found up to 2 s prior to 
action. This ‘probed’ awareness has its onset around the 
same time as the brain starts preparing the act, as measured 
using EEG. First of all, this undermines straightforward 
interpretations about the temporal relation between uncon-
scious brain states and conscious intentions and actions. 
Secondly, we suggest that these results present a problem 
for the view that intentions are mental states occurring at 
a single point in time. Instead, we suggest the results to 
support the interpretation of an intention to act as a multi-
stage process developing over time. This process of intend-
ing seems to develop during the process of acting, leaving 
reportable traces in consciousness at certain points along 
the road.
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relying on self-initiated post-action reports, they used 
auditory probes to initiate a real-time intention report 
prior to action performance. Using this method, the onset 
of the intention to act was measured up to 1.42 s prior 
to movement, much earlier than the 0.2 s of Libet et al. 
(1983). These results could be taken to contradict each 
other as a single intention to act apparently can have dif-
ferent onsets. Alternatively, they might represent different 
stages in the process of intending. However, up till now, 
the question of whether the reported onsets of intending 
indeed differ significantly between the Libet and Mat-
suhashi task within the same individual has not been 
explored.
We developed a within-subject experiment in order 
to investigate whether different ways of measuring (i.e. 
self-initiated report vs. auditory probing) lead to differ-
ent onsets of intending. We expected the onset of intend-
ing measured with auditory probes (Matsuhashi task) to 
significantly precede the onset of intending measured with 
self-initiated reports (Libet task). Furthermore, we inves-
tigated during which phases of the neural preparation for 
action the measured onsets of intending arise. We meas-
ured three neural signatures of the preparation for vol-
untary movement using electroencephalography (EEG): 
the readiness potential (RP), lateralized readiness poten-
tial (LRP) (Kornhueber and Deecke 1965; Shibasaki and 
Hallett 2006), and the event-related desynchronization 
(ERD) in the alpha and beta band over the motor cortex 
(Pfurtscheller and Aranibar 1979). These signatures have 
been successfully used for the single-trial prediction of 
the onset of voluntary movement in previous research (Bai 
et al. 2011; Blankertz et al. 2006; Lew et al. 2012; Schnei-
der et al. 2013).
The results of our experiment are interpreted within a 
conceptual framework that is an extension of the what, 
when, and whether model proposed by Brass and Hag-
gard (2008). Within this framework, results of studies 
like that of Libet et al. (1983) and Matsuhashi and Hallett 
(2008) complement rather than contradict each other. In 
fact, they seem to suggest that before a participant is able 
to provide a self-initiated report of intending their act, 
some form of action-related awareness is already present 
and can be revealed by using external probes. We suggest 
that these results and those of previous research support 
the interpretation of an intention to act as a multistage 
process developing over time (Dennett 1991; Uithol et al. 
2014).
Experimental methods
We combined adapted versions of the Libet and Matsu-
hashi task into a within-subject experiment. We believe 
that intended actions generally involve some form of 
reasoning about the current situation and relevant back-
ground information and usually lead to some observ-
able effect for which the agent can take responsibil-
ity (Mecacci and Haselager, submitted). In the original 
Matsuhashi task, the acts did not involve any reasoning 
and did not have any effect. Therefore, we made some 
changes to the original task design. Inspired by Grey Wal-
ter (Dennett 1991, p. 167), we instructed our participants 
to watch slides on a computer screen. The participants 
could proceed to a new slide by pressing a button when-
ever they wanted to. With this everyday task, we created a 
more realistic experimental setting since the acts could be 
made for a reason (where the simplest one is being bored 
of the current slide) and have an effect (presenting a new 
slide on the computer screen). Furthermore, participants 
did not perform their actions with a certain frequency, but 
performed one action on each trial in order to enhance the 
level of spontaneity. Finally, in our versions of the Libet 
and Matsuhashi tasks, participants were free to choose 
what action to perform (a left or right hand button press) 
and when to perform it.
Participants
Twelve healthy volunteers (23 ± 4 years old, 7 females, 10 
right-handed) were tested. All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and gave informed consent. The 
study was conducted in accordance with the ethical stand-
ards provided by the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki.
Apparatus
Instructions and stimuli were displayed on a 17″ TFT 
screen with a resolution of 800 × 600 pixels and 60-Hz 
refresh rate. In-ear headphones were used for auditory 
stimuli. The participant held one small button box in each 
hand and used a computer mouse to indicate the remem-
bered clock configurations during the Libet task. The 
experiments were run in BrainStream1 (Severens 2009). 
EEG was recorded with a Biosemi Active 2 system using 
64 Ag/AgCl active electrodes sampled at 2048 Hz placed 
according to the International 10/20 system (Klem et al. 
1999). Electrode offsets were kept under 25-μV. Four elec-
trooculogram (EOG) electrodes, placed in bipolar pairs 
above/below the left eye and on the outer sides of both 
eyes, were used to record the muscular activity related to 
eye blinks and movements. To measure muscle activity in 
the arms, electromyogram (EMG) electrodes were placed 
1 See www.brainstream.nu.
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in two bipolar pairs on the centre of the forearm (flexor 
flexor pollicis longus) and on both wrists.
Procedures
The participant was seated at a table in an electrically 
shielded room with the display 70 cm directly in front of 
them. Five experimental tasks were tested: the Libet task, 
Matsuhashi task, sound–response task, reaction time task, 
and no-action task. Whereas the Libet and Matsuhashi 
task were the main focus of this study, the remaining tasks 
served to train the participants in performing these tasks.
The experiment was split into two sessions: a behav-
ioural session and an EEG session. The behavioural session 
consisted of: 5 reaction time trials and 30 Matsuhashi trials 
for training purposes (15 min), 2 × 20 reaction time trials 
alternated with 3 × 50 Matsuhashi trials for main testing 
(30 min), and finally 20 sound–response trials and 10 Libet 
trials to prepare for the EEG session (15 min). The EEG 
session consisted of alternate blocks of 6 × 50 Matsuhashi 
trials, 4 × 25 Libet trials, and 2 × 25 no-action trials 
(60 min).
At the end of the experiment, the participants filled in 
a questionnaire (15 min). The total duration of the experi-
ment with self-paced breaks between blocks was approxi-
mately 3 h.
Libet task
First, a stationary clock was presented for a period of 2 s. 
After that, it started running (see Fig. 1a). Participants were 
instructed to keep their eyes focused on the centre of the 
clock. After the clock had made one revolution, partici-
pants were free to decide which button to press (a left or 
right thumb button press) and when to press it. Participants 
were instructed to wait for the feeling of wanting to press 
either button to arise and remember the configuration of 
the clock at that time. When participants pressed a button, 
the clock stopped running after a random interval between 
0.5 and 1 s. A new clock without a hand was presented 
Fig. 1  a Stimuli provided to a participant during a Libet trial. First, 
a stationary clock was presented. After 2 s, the clock started running 
and the participant could press a button with either their left or right 
hand whenever they felt the intention to do so. When a button was 
pressed, the participant reported the remembered clock position at the 
time of the intention to act. Finally, the participant reported whether 
the act was: ‘made spontaneously’, ‘planned’ or ‘don’t know’. b 
Sequence of events in a Matsuhashi trial in which a participant was 
aware of intending to act at the moment the auditory probe was pre-
sented (at 8 s) and waited for the trial to end (at 12 s). When the trial 
ended the participant was asked whether or not they had vetoed their 
act upon hearing the auditory probe
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and participants used the mouse to indicate the remem-
bered hand position at the time they felt the intention to act. 
When participants were satisfied with the indicated clock 
position, they clicked “OK”. Finally, the question “How 
would you describe your action?” was displayed on the 
screen. Participants could answer with: (1) Spontaneous, 
(2) Planned or (3) Don’t know.
Matsuhashi task
Participants were watching slides on a computer screen2 
(see Fig. 1b), each containing one natural landscape image 
(12 × 12 cm). Participants were instructed to focus on the 
fixation point, empty their thoughts, breathe deeply in and 
out and relax before intending any act. Participants could 
press a button with their left or right thumb to go to a new 
slide. While looking at these slides, a short beep was pre-
sented at a random point in time. Upon the presentation of 
this auditory probe, participants should: (1) veto their act if 
they were intending to act at the time they heard the beep 
and wait until the current image disappears from the screen, 
or (2) otherwise ignore the probe. When a participant 
pressed a button, the image slid off the screen in the direc-
tion of the button that was pressed. Participants could relax 
for 2 s between each trial. Whenever a trial ended and no 
button had been pressed (caused by a conscious veto or the 
absence of an intention to act), a question was presented, 
asking participants whether or not they had vetoed the act 
upon probe presentation.
Participants were instructed not to plan but to act as 
spontaneously as possible. If participants were acting too 
quickly (within the first 4 s of a trial) or showed a certain 
fixed action pattern (for example, alternate left and right 
hand actions), they were reminded to make sure to take 
their time and not plan their actions. A maximum trial 
length was defined in order to continue to the next trial in 
case of a veto. To prevent absolute predictability of the trial 
length, it was set semi-randomly such that 80 % of the tri-
als lasted 11 s, 10 % lasted 12 s and 10 % lasted 13 s. In 
case a trial would end before participants had intended to 
press a button, they were instructed not to worry and con-
tinue their normal routine at the start of the new trial.
In order to optimize the probe onsets such that most 
occur during the interesting action intention period, an indi-
vidual probe distribution was used for each participant. Ini-
tially using the training data and the updated every 50 tri-
als, the average and standard deviation of the movement 
onset times were computed. A probe window was defined 
as 0.5 s before the average movement onset (i.e. button 
2 Images were selected from Flickr’s Creative Commons (www.
flickr.com/creativecommons) and were roughly symmetrical without 
any animate objects.
press) plus and minus one standard deviation. The window 
was shifted by −0.5 s to increase the chance that a probe 
was presented prior to action onset.3 Within this window, 
70 % of the probes occur before and 30 % after the average 
movement onset −0.5 s.
The Matsuhashi task of the behavioural session con-
tained many auditory probes in order to optimize the inten-
tion estimate. However, it contained very few probes in 
the EEG session in order to minimize auditory artefacts. 
Specifically, in 4 Matsuhashi blocks of the EEG session, 8 
out of 10 trials probed at 10 s after trial onset whereas the 
remaining 2 trials were probed randomly. This increased 
the chance that the participant would act before probe 
presentation in the EEG session. The participants were not 
informed about these differences.
Training tasks
The sound–response task was similar to the Libet task; 
only here the participant should remember the configura-
tion of the clock and press a button at the time they heard 
an auditory stimulus (the same short beep as used in the 
Matsuhashi task). This task was used to train a participant 
in remembering and reporting clock configurations for the 
Libet task. Furthermore, this task served as global accuracy 
measure of the reported clock configurations.
A simple reaction time task was used to assess the 
elapsed time between the presentation of an auditory 
probe and a button press. At the start of each trial, a fixa-
tion cross was presented for 1 s, which was followed by 
a black screen. At a random point in time within an inter-
val of 3 s, a beep sound was presented. Upon hearing the 
sound, the participant was instructed to press a button with 
either the left or right thumb as soon as possible. The trials 
were divided into two blocks, one for left and one for right 
hand responses.
These trials were similar to the Matsuhashi task, with 
the difference that the images slided off automatically to 
the left or right side of the screen after a random interval of 
5–5.5 s. They served to bias participants towards pressing a 
button roughly each 5 s without explicitly instructing them 
to do so.
Questionnaire
At the end of the experiment, the participants filled in a 
questionnaire on their subjective experience during the 
3 During training, this time window was set by default to run from 3 
to 8 s. When the variance of a participant’s movement onset distribu-
tion was <1.5 s, it was automatically set to 1.5 s in order to keep a 
minimum window of 3 s within which probes could be presented. If 
the calculated time window fell within the baseline period or outside 
the maximum trial length, it was automatically set to a minimum of 
3.5 s and a maximum of 10.5 s, respectively.
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Matsuhashi task. This questionnaire aimed to find out 
whether the acts were made spontaneously, whether a cer-
tain action strategy was used, and whether the probes had 
affected decision-making.
EEG analysis
The raw data of the Libet and Matsuhashi tasks was sliced 
in trials of 8 s around each button press (from 6 s before 
each button press until 2 s after). Each trial was labelled 
according to its action type: a left or a right hand action. 
Furthermore, the raw EEG data were down-sampled from 
2048 to 128 Hz. For the Libet task, only trials in which the 
act was reported to be ‘spontaneous’ were used in the anal-
ysis, i.e. ‘don’t know’ or ‘planned’ trials were excluded. 
Furthermore, trials in which the button press occurred 
within 4 s of the trial start were excluded, since the baseline 
period might include reactions to the stimuli changes at the 
start of the trial. For the Matsuhashi task, only trials con-
taining a button press were used for EEG analysis, exclud-
ing those in which the button press occurred within 4.5 s 
from the trial start.4 Trials in which a probe was presented 
within 4.5 s prior to the act were excluded, since they cause 
an additional event-related potential in the EEG, which 
may interfere with the baseline. To remove noise from the 
recorded raw EEG, the data was pre-processed in the fol-
lowing order:
•	 Linear detrending to remove slow drifts from the data
•	 Re-referencing to the common-average
•	 Rejection of bad trials (and channels) where the trial 
(resp. channel) power deviated more than 3.5 standard 
deviations from the median
•	 Removal of eye blinks and movements by linear decor-
relation of the EEG and the EOG (Gratton 1998)
The EEG signal from 3.5 s until 2.5 s before each button 
press was used as a baseline for both the Libet and Matsu-
hashi task. Since the participants were instructed to relax 
and wait for their intention to act to arise during both tasks, 
this period was assumed to represent normal brain activ-
ity. Furthermore, we did not expect the RP or ERD signals 
to occur earlier than 2 s prior to action onset (Kornhueber 
and Deecke 1965; Shibasaki and Hallett 2006; Pfurtschel-
ler and Aranibar 1979). As described above, only trials in 
which the baseline period contained resting non-artefact 
contaminated EEG data were analysed.
4 This period was 0.5 s longer than the one used in the Libet task 
because the visual stimuli changes at the start of a Matsuhashi trial 
(the presentation of a new image) were larger and might cause a 
longer brain response than those at the start of a Libet trial (the transi-
tion from a stationary to a running clock).
For the RP and LRP analysis, the EEG data were band-
pass-filtered between 0 and 15 Hz, and any power above 
30 Hz was completely removed. Next, for each electrode 
and trial, the average baseline signal was subtracted from 
the data. Finally, the data were further down-sampled to 
96 Hz.5 For the ERD analysis, the signal amplitude in the 
alpha (8–12 Hz) and beta (13–30 Hz) bands was calculated 
using a Hilbert transform between 8 and 30 Hz. Next, the 
baseline (running from −3.5 until −2.5 s) was subtracted 
and the data down-sampled to 96 Hz. The Hilbert transform 
represents a signal in terms of its amplitude and phase in 
the target frequency range varying over time (Bruns 2004). 
Here we only used the amplitude at each time point allow-
ing us to use the same methods to find the alpha/beta ERD 
onset as used for the RP. A spectrogram was also calculated 
using the short-time Fourier transform (STFT) technique 
(Bruns 2004), restricted to the frequency range of interest 
(3–40 Hz) followed by subtraction of the baseline activity, 
using the same baseline period as for the other analyses.
Two different measures were used to determine the time 
point at which the ERD and RP started for each individual 
participant:
1. Eye-measure: starting at the time of the button press, 
we looked back in time to determine the point at which 
five subsequent data samples were above the baseline 
value (similar to: Libet et al. 1983; Keller and Heck-
hausen 1990). For this measurement, we used only 
the Cz electrode as the early RP and ERD were most 
clearly expressed in this location (Shibasaki and Hal-
lett 2006). Since there were no signs of lateraliza-
tion within the RP or ERD at the CZ electrode, this 
measurement was based on the average EEG over all 
actions.
2. Classifier-measure: in order to get a more reliable 
estimate of the ERD and RP onset, we trained a regu-
larised logistic regression classifier on baseline and 
action preparation data (similar to Lew et al. 2012). 
For this analysis, we used a slightly broader range of 
electrodes (Cz, C1, C2, C3, C4, FCz, FC1, FC2, FC3, 
FC4, CPz, CP1, CP2, CP3, CP4) in order to catch the 
extended brain signal correlated to motor preparation. 
During the baseline period (running from −3.5 to 
−2.5 s prior to action), we assumed that there was no 
neural preparation for action. For each trial, we took 
a 500 ms sample (running from −3 to 2.5 s prior to 
5 We expected the RP/LRP signal to occur below 2 Hz and the alpha/
beta ERD to occur between 8 and 30 Hz. Since the maximum compo-
nent frequency that we expected to find is 30 Hz, the Nyquist rate was 
60 Hz. Therefore, we did not expect to find any informative informa-
tion in the EEG data above 60 Hz.
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action) from the baseline period. These samples rep-
resented the baseline class. 500-ms Action preparation 
samples were taken each 10 ms between −2.5 and 0 s 
prior to action. The samples taken from a specific time 
period over all trials represented the action prepara-
tion class of that specific time period. For each time 
period—i.e. [−2.500, −2.000], [−2.490, −1.990], 
…, [−0.510, −0.010], [−0.500, 0.000]—we trained 
a separate classifier to distinguish between baseline 
samples and action preparation samples using tenfold 
cross-validation. The classifier input thus consisted of 
a vector of [15 channels, 49 time points, × trials] (see 
Online Resource 5 for the amount of artefact-free tri-
als that was used for each participant). Classification 
performances were considered significant when they 
were above the binomial confidence interval (Billinger 
et al. 2013). The RP and ERD onset were determined 
by looking backward in time as the earliest time point 
after which three subsequent classification perfor-
mances were insignificant.
The LRP was calculated for each participant using the 
following formula (as in Trevena and Miller 2002):
where C3 and C4 are the EEG recordings over the motor 
cortex of the left and right hemisphere, respectively, and l 
and r indicate the average EEG activity of left or right hand 
actions, respectively. The LRP onset was determined by 
looking backwards from the time point of the button press 
to the time point where five data samples in a row were 
above the baseline value (Libet et al. 1983).
LRP = [(C3l − C4l)+ (C4r − C3r)]/2
Results
Reaction times
Whenever the measured EMG exceeded 20 µV, the mus-
cle was assumed to be active, indicating a button was 
being pressed. The average difference over all participants 
between the button press and the onset of EMG activity 
was −0.002 s (SD = 0.004 s) for both the Libet and Mat-
suhashi task. Since this difference was so small, the button 
press instead of the EMG activity was used to indicate the 
action onset.
For the reaction time trials, the average reaction time 
over all participants between hearing the beep and press-
ing a button was 0.295 s (SD = 0.087 s). For the sound–
response trials, the average was 0.365 s (SD = 0.182 s). 
The average difference over all participants between the 
actual and reported sound onsets of the sound–response tri-
als was 0.088 s (SD = 0.037 s). An overview of all reaction 
times can be found in Online Resource 1.
Onset of intending
An overview of the results on the onset of intending during 
the Libet and Matsuhashi task, including the onsets of the 
point of no return, is provided in Table 1.
Libet task
For each Libet trial, the onset of intending to act was calcu-
lated by counting backwards from the button press. Since 
each button press should have been made spontaneously, 
the intention was assumed to arrive within 2.56 s before a 
Table 1  Overview of the 
intention, point of no return 
(PONR), alpha/beta event-
related desynchronization 
(ERD), readiness potential 
(RP), and lateralized RP (LRP) 
onsets of both the Libet (Lib.) 
and Matsuhashi (Mat.) task
The ERD and RP onsets were calculated using a classifier and the LRP onsets were calculated by eye. The 
mean and standard deviation (SD) are provided for each column
Subject Intention (s) PONR (s) ERD (s) RP (s) LRP (s)
Lib. Mat. Mat. Lib. Mat. Lib. Mat. Lib. Mat.
1 −0.325 −1.837 −0.250 −1.820 −0.510 −1.320 −2.200 −0.270 −0.560
2 −0.048 −1.200 −0.200 −1.710 −2.030 −1.640 −0.810 −0.320 −1.370
3 −0.059 −2.478 −0.200 −1.040 −0.780 −0.760 −1.260 – −0.400
4 −0.241 −3.249 −0.267 −2.170 −0.540 −0.950 −1.320 – −1.350
5 −0.005 −0.758 −0.080 −0.790 – −2.330 −0.570 – −0.380
6 −0.063 −2.672 −0.132 −1.070 −0.510 −1.940 −0.980 −2.310 –
7 −0.135 −2.000 −0.204 −1.210 − −2.480 −1.370 − −2.810
8 −0.051 −2.594 −0.199 −1.340 −1.560 −0.590 −1.200 −0.310 −0.410
9 −0.074 −2.946 −0.670 −0.790 −0.990 −1.570 −2.600 −0.350 −0.910
10 −0.514 −1.662 −0.378 −2.430 −2.310 −1.750 −2.480 −0.820 −0.480
11 −0.087 −1.450 −0.199 −2.460 −1.740 −2.940 −1.230 −0.380 −0.530
12 −0.132 −3.196 −0.249 −0.510 – −1.440 −1.680 −0.540 −0.230
Mean −0.145 −2.170 −0.252 −1.445 −1.219 −1.643 −1.475 −0.660 −0.860
SD 0.147 0.809 0.150 0.663 0.702 0.705 0.644 0.690 0.760
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button press (within one revolution of the clock). However, 
on some trials the angle between the 12 o’clock position 
and the clock hand at the time of intending was just larger 
than that of the clock hand at the time of the button press 
(for more details, see Online Resource 2). This makes sense 
given that the participants were on average 0.088 s late (see 
the “Reaction times” section) in reporting the remembered 
clock configurations—which translates to an inaccuracy of 
122° in the hand position. To address this issue, clock hand 
angles up to 40° after the angle of the button press were 
treated as coming after the button press, with all others 
before the button press.
Matsuhashi task
In order to calculate the onset of intending to act during 
the Matsuhashi trials, the intention and probe distribu-
tions were calculated for each participant (see Fig. 2c for 
the distributions of participant 2). The intention distribu-
tion refers to the distribution of the amount of probes that 
were followed by a button press at a later point in time. 
The probe distribution refers to the amount of probes that 
were scheduled for presentation during the experiment. The 
intention distribution started to differentiate from the probe 
distribution close to action onset. All probes that have been 
followed by a veto will not appear in the intention distribu-
tion, thus causing a gap: a period of time close to action 
onset in which the presented probes were followed by a 
veto. During this gap, lots of probes were presented, but 
no longer ignored since the participant started intending 
their act. Very close to action onset, the intention distribu-
tion becomes similar to the probe distribution again. At this 
point of no return, although a probe was presented to a par-
ticipant who was intending to act, they could no longer veto 
their act since the probe occurred too close to action onset. 
The onset of intending was estimated by fitting a sigmoid 
to the intention distribution (see Online Resource 3).
The questionnaire showed that 11 of the participants 
reported feeling relaxed or at ease during the Matsuhashi 
task. None of the participants used a strategy to perform 
their acts and 11 participants confirmed that they had made 
their actions spontaneously or intentionally on each trial. 
Fig. 2  a Grand average of the 
RP for the Matsuhashi task. 
As can be seen in C3 and C4, 
the lateralized nature of the RP 
was clearly expressed close to 
action onset. b Grand average 
time–frequency representation 
of the data of the Matsuhashi 
task. The ERD in the alpha/
beta range was clearly visible 
and seemed to start around 
1.5 s prior to action onset (time 
zero). c The intention (blue) 
and probe (grey) distributions 
of participant 2. Each bar in the 
intention distribution represents 
the average number of times 
that a probe was presented and 
ignored at a certain point in 
time prior to an act. Each bar in 
the probe distribution represents 
the average theoretical number 
of probes that have been pre-
sented at a certain point in time. 
For example: 1 s prior to action, 
two probes were presented, 
ignored and followed by an 
action 1.4 s later. However, at 
that time a total of seven probes 
have been presented. This 
means that five probes were not 
followed by an act, since the 
participant started intending 
their act and performed a veto 
upon probe presentation (colour 
figure online)
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All subjects confirmed that they felt that they were free to 
choose what action they would like to perform and when 
they would like to perform it. Six participants found it hard 
to judge whether or not they were already intending their 
act at the moment that they were presented with a probe. 
Moreover, three participants reported that sometimes probe 
presentation induced a feeling of intending to act (see 
Online Resource 4 for more details).
EEG data
For the Libet task, 82 % of the actions over all participants 
were reported as ‘spontaneous’ and were used for subse-
quent analysis. In total 10 % of the actions were reported 
as ‘don’t know’and 8 % as ‘planned’, all of these trials 
were excluded from the analysis. On average 82 (40 left 
and 42 right hand actions) and 156 (72 left and 84 right 
hand actions) artefact-free trials were included in the per-
participant EEG analysis of the Libet and Matsuhashi task, 
respectively. The exact numbers of artefact-free trials of 
each participant are provided in Online Resource 5.
The RP onsets are provided in Table 1. The mean sig-
nificant performance of the classifier was between 54.94 % 
(SD = 1.48 %) and 72.30 % (SD = 4.80 %) for the Libet 
task and between 53.72 % (SD = 1.09 %) and 68.59 % 
(SD = 5.42 %) for the Matsuhashi task. In addition to the 
RP onsets that were calculated for each participant, the RP 
onset of the grand average over all participants was also 
calculated using the RP eye method (see Online Resource 
6). The RP onset of the grand average was found to lie at 
−1.938 s for the Matsuhashi task and at −2.914 s for the 
Libet task. The grand average over Cz, C3, and C4 for the 
Matsuhashi task can be viewed in Fig. 2a.
An overview of the LRP results is shown in Table 1. Par-
ticipant 7 for the Libet task was excluded from this analysis 
as only a single left hand action was performed. Further-
more, participant 6 of the Matsuhashi task and participants 
3, 4, and 5 of the Libet task were excluded as the LRPs 
were obscured by noise. The grand average of the LRP 
onset over all participants was also calculated in a similar 
way (for an image, see Online Resource 7). The grand aver-
age of the LRP onset was found to lie at −0.570 s for the 
Matsuhashi task and at −0.320 s for the Libet task.
An overview of the ERD results is shown in Table 1. 
The mean significant performance of the classifier used to 
calculate the alpha/beta ERD onset was between 55.32 % 
(SD = 1.52 %) and 70.91 % (SD = 6.22 %) for the Libet 
task and between 53.46 % (SD = 1.32 %) and 66.07 % 
(SD = 4.32 %) for the Matsuhashi task. The grand average 
plot of the Hilbert transform of the Matsuhashi task can be 
found in Online Resource 8. Participants 5, 7, and 12 from 
the Matsuhashi task were excluded from this analysis, as 
the ERD was not visible. The grand average spectrogram is 
shown in Fig. 2b.
Comparison Libet versus Matsuhashi
Multiple paired-sample and one-sided paired-sample t tests 
were used to establish the temporal order of events prior to 
action performance.6 The alpha threshold was set to 0.001 
using the Bonferroni correction (Rice 1989). The detailed 
results of these t tests can be found in Online Resource 9. 
These tests were performed on complete data only. For 
instance, in order to investigate whether the LRP arises 
consistently earlier than the RP, only the results of partici-
pants for which both the RP and LRP onsets could be accu-
rately calculated were used in the analysis.
In summary, the onset of intending as measured using 
the Matsuhashi task seemed to arise around −2.170 s 
prior to action. Around the same point in time, the RP 
and ERD had their onset around −1.446 s prior to action. 
After that, the LRP had its onset around −0.760 s prior 
to action onset. The LRP was followed by the point of no 
return around −0.252 s prior to action. The onset of intend-
ing as measured using the Libet task was reported around 
−0.145 s prior to action. Figure 3 provides an overview of 
these results for the Matsuhashi task. Please note that this 
figure looks almost identical for the Libet task (see Online 
Resource 10).
Furthermore, using a within-subject cluster-based per-
mutation test,7 we tested whether the RP and alpha/beta 
ERD data were exchangeable between the Libet and Mat-
suhashi tasks (using electrodes: Cz, C1, C2, C3, C4, FCz, 
FC1, FC2, FC3, FC4, CPz, CP1, CP2, CP3 and CP4). No 
significant difference was found between the RP data of the 
Libet and Matsuhashi task. However, one positive cluster 
was identified between the Hilbert transform data 
(8–30 Hz) of the Libet and Matsuhashi task, indicating that 
the alpha/beta ERD of these tasks differed significantly 
over time (for details, see Online Resource 8).
6 No significant differences were found between the ERD and RP 
onsets calculated by eye or by classifier (see Online Resource 9). The 
calculation by classifier is the more conservative and reliable meas-
urement since it aims to detect the ERD or RP onset as the point at 
which the EEG signal is significantly below the baseline over all indi-
vidual trials. Therefore, the onsets calculated by classifier are used as 
the ERD and RP onset in the rest of the article. The ERD and RP 
onsets calculated by eye can be found in Online Resource 6.
7 See http://www.fieldtriptoolbox.org/tutorial/cluster_permutation_
timelock.
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Discussion
We have conducted a within-subject comparison between 
the Libet and Matsuhashi task in order to investigate 
whether different ways of measuring (i.e. self-initiated 
report vs. external probing) lead to different onsets of 
intending. Furthermore, we investigated during which 
phases of the neural preparation for action the measured 
onsets of intending occur. Our main hypothesis was con-
firmed: the onset of intending measured using external 
probes (Matsuhashi task) preceded the onset of intending 
measured using self-initiated reports (Libet task). This dif-
ference was 2 s on average and highly significant. Moreo-
ver, the onset of intending measured with the Matsuhashi 
task occurred around the same time as the onset of the RP 
and ERD. The onset of intending measured with the Mat-
suhashi task did significantly precede the onset of the LRP 
by 1.41 s and the point of no return by 1.92 s on average. 
Both the RP and ERD significantly preceded the onset of 
the point of no return and the onset of intending measured 
with the Libet task. Lastly, the RP significantly preceded 
the LRP by 0.80 s on average.
Before proceeding to any conclusions or interpreta-
tions of the data, there are some limitations of this study 
that need to be addressed. First of all, the sample size of 
12 participants for this study is quite low, even though it 
is comparable to previous research (Libet et al. 1983; Hag-
gard and Eimer 1999; Matsuhashi and Hallett 2008; Bai 
et al. 2011; Miller et al. 2011). The number of participants 
included in the analysis was even lower since the ERD and/
or LRP of some participants was not visible or obscured by 
noise (as described in the “EEG data” section). However, 
since we performed paired-sample statistics, we conducted 
our analysis on the individual data of each participant. 
Moreover, the significance of our main results indicates 
that we tested a sufficient amount of participants in order 
to draw a valid conclusion: the onset of intending measured 
using external probes (Matsuhashi task) preceded the onset 
of intending measured using self-initiated reports (Libet 
task). Although our main conclusion seems valid, more 
data should be collected in order to clarify the more sub-
tle effects that were found in the data. For instance, from 
the present data we cannot conclude whether the ERD pre-
cedes the RP or whether the point of no return precedes the 
intention onset as measured by the Libet task.
Secondly, the Matsuhashi task needs more validation, as 
it remains unclear whether the auditory probes are effective 
in measuring the onset of the intention to act. As described 
in the “Matsuhashi task” section, half of the participants 
found it difficult to judge whether they had intended to act 
upon probe presentation and three participants reported 
that sometimes it felt like the probes induced an intention 
to act. Therefore, the early onset of intending as measured 
during the Matsuhashi task might be due to a task-related 
artefact. The present results cannot exclude whether the 
probes might have triggered an intention to act or whether 
the probes induced a false-positive intention report. A 
false-positive intention report means that upon probe 
presentation, the participant believed they were intending 
to act, even though they in fact were not. However, since 
the reported onsets of intending from the Matsuhashi task 
occur consistently and significantly earlier in time com-
pared to those of the Libet task, it seems unlikely that this 
difference in intending can be explained as a side effect of 
the probes alone. Moreover, the intention distributions of 
the Matsuhashi task show that the probes at least do not 
Fig. 3  Box-and-whisker plot of the estimated RP, LRP, alpha/beta 
ERD and intention onsets over all participants. The boxes denote 
the first and third quartiles of the data and the whiskers extend to the 
most extreme data points (outliers are denoted by a red cross). The 
median is denoted by a vertical line inside the box. The RP and alpha/
beta ERD boxes incorporate the onsets estimated by classifier for the 
Matsuhashi task. Similarly, the LRP box incorporates the estimated 
LRP onsets by eye for the Matsuhashi task. A red star indicates that 
the estimated onsets differed significantly between the indicated 
groups with p < 0.05 (colour figure online)
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always induce an intention to act: there is a specific early 
time range prior to the act where the probes are ignored 
since the participant was not yet intending to act (for exam-
ple, up to approximately 1.3 s before action as shown in 
Fig. 2a for Participant 2). More interestingly, there is a spe-
cific time range in which the probes caused a veto of the 
act. Regardless of whether these vetos indicate a false posi-
tive, triggered or true intention onset, they at least indicate 
that there is a specific period in time prior to action onset 
in which one is aware of intending to act or in which one 
is susceptible to external disturbances. Future research is 
necessary to determine what exactly is causing these vetos.
In this study, we were not aiming to validate the experi-
mental designs of Libet or Matsuhashi, we simply wanted 
to compare their results in a within-subject design. For the 
remainder of this paper, we would like to focus on the pos-
sibility that the Libet and Matsuhashi tasks show a differ-
ence in intention onset. Under this assumption, our results 
show that the intention onset as measured using the Mat-
suhashi task significantly precedes the intention onset as 
measured using the Libet task. This could mean that (1) 
the Libet and Matsuhashi task evoke two different types of 
intentions which have different onsets or (2) a single inten-
tion can have two different onsets depending on its meas-
urement procedure. Since the Libet and Matsuhashi task 
require the exact same motor action, it seems implausible 
that the corresponding intention to act would be entirely 
distinct. Therefore, we would like to argue that the Libet 
and Matsuhashi task measure the same intention, but dur-
ing different phases inside a process of intending. The Libet 
task measures the point in time at which one is first able to 
(verbally) report on one’s own to be intending an act. The 
Matsuhashi task measures the point in time at which one is 
first able to report to be intending an act when being asked. 
In other words, our results suggest that before a person is 
able to provide a self-initiated report of intending their act, 
some form of action-related awareness is already present 
and can be revealed using external probes. We suggest that 
these results and those of previous research support the 
interpretation of an intention to act as a multistage process 
developing over time.
The process of intending
Major advances have been made in measuring the neural 
correlates of intentional action (Bai et al. 2011; Blankertz 
et al. 2006; Lew et al. 2012; Schurger et al. 2012; Soon 
et al. 2008). An influential distinction between what, when, 
and whether aspects of intentional action is proposed by 
Brass and Haggard (2008). They show that the neural prep-
aration for an intended act seems to be distributed in both 
time and space as it seems to start in the frontal regions of 
the brain and gradually travels backwards towards the 
motor cortex (further described by Brass et al. 2013). In 
their model, Brass and Haggard describe the different 
phases of the neural preparation for action that seems to be 
correlated with the what, when, and whether decisions 
involved in a voluntary act. In this section, we would like to 
extend this model by adding information on the subjective 
experience of intending. Moreover, we distinguish our-
selves from the original model as we interpret the what, 
when, and whether decisions not as different states of 
intending, but as different phases of intending (in line with: 
Dennett 2003, p. 238; Uithol et al. 2014). In other words, 
we find that, similar to the neural preparatory activity for 
action, the intention to act is also distributed in time. 
Below, we suggest a conceptual framework describing this 
process of intending8 (see Fig. 4). The framework distin-
guishes three aspects of intentional action: the different 
phases in the process of intending, the potential neural cor-
relates of each of these phases, and the timing of the 
reported onsets of being aware of intending to act.
First, we will describe the five phases of intending:
1. Global whether decision: a global phase that starts 
when a participant decides to participate in the experi-
ment.
2. Waiting: in between the start of a trial and the moment 
of deciding what action to perform and when to per-
form it, there is a period of doing nothing/waiting dur-
ing which the urge to act comes and goes. These urges 
might be represented by the random fluctuations in 
neural activity as found by Schurger et al. (2012).
3. Deciding what: a phase during which specifics about 
the particular type of action (e.g. pressing a left vs right 
button) are processed
4. Deciding when: the moment of action is being decided 
when an urge to act crosses a certain threshold.
5. Local whether decision: a phase in which vetoing an 
intended act is still possible.
Second, we describe the different phases of intending in 
relation to the reports concerning the participants’ aware-
ness of their intention to act. Investigations of the Matsu-
hashi and Libet tasks indicate that different ways of report-
ing provide different ‘windows of introspection’ on the 
intentional process. In our experiment two such windows 
were studied. First of all, the ‘aware when probed’: the 
8 Note that the global whether component will not play a big role 
on a single-trial level in this kind of experiment since a participant 
agrees to perform an act on each trial by obeying the provided experi-
mental instructions. Making this agreement leads to implementing the 
whether component of intending by forming a global intention to act 
and having an overall readiness for action. However, which action to 
perform and when to perform it have to be decided spontaneously on 
single trial.
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participant might be able to report intending their act when 
they are probed by an external stimulus. Secondly, the 
‘self-initiated awareness report’: at this point, the decision 
to act enters the participant’s awareness, which enables the 
subsequent report of consciously willing to act.
Third, we describe the potential neural correlates of the 
intentional process. It is currently not clear whether sepa-
rate neural correlates of each of the five postulated phases 
can be identified. Yet, one can suggest links between the 
sequence of phases in the process of intending and various 
results on action preparation (Bai et al. 2011; Bode et al. 
2011; Blankertz et al. 2006; Libet et al. 1983; Pfurtscheller 
and Aranibar 1979; Soon et al. 2008; Schurger et al. 2012; 
Trevena and Miller 2002). Between the (global) whether 
and what decision, urges to act might come and go. These 
urges might be represented by the fluctuations described by 
Schurger et al. (2012). These fluctuations might continue 
until one of them crosses a certain threshold and leads to 
a decision on the what and/or when component in the pro-
cess of intending. Furthermore, the early frontal lobe activ-
ity found by Soon et al. (2008) and Bode et al. (2011) is 
suggested to be predictive of the subsequent act and might 
arise during the waiting phase, leading to the what decision 
in the process of intending. The activity in the pre-SMA 
and SMA, as found by Libet et al. (1983) and Soon et al. 
(2008), might be more tightly linked to the initiation of the 
subsequent act, representing the when decision in the pro-
cess of intending (Brass et al. 2013).
Clearly, many details need to be further specified and 
experimentally investigated. Yet, the folk psychological 
interpretation of intending to act as occurring at a single 
point in time does not map correctly onto the results pre-
sented in this paper, as an intention to act is found to be 
distributed in time. It seems to be much more plausible that 
an intention to act is in fact a multi-stage process develop-
ing over time. If so, differentially timed reports and neural 
correlates are exactly what one would expect.
Conclusion
This study presents another step in the investigation of 
the different phases in the process of intending and has 
focused on those phases that are close to action onset. The 
average onset of intending measured using the Matsuhashi 
task did not differ significantly from the RP and alpha/
beta ERD onset, suggesting that these processes have their 
onset around the same point in time. The RP and alpha/
beta ERD seem to play a part in the final stages of action 
preparation. However, movement intent is visible much 
earlier in time: starting in the frontal cortex and moving up 
to the (pre) supplementary motor area (Bode et al. 2011; 
Fig. 4  Process of intending consists of five phases (top box): 1 global 
whether decision, 2 waiting, 3 deciding what, 4 deciding when and 
5 local whether decision. The phases in the process of intending run 
from abstract (global agreement to participate) to specific (know-
ing which action to perform and when to perform it). The middle 
box shows the reported onsets of intending. Phase in the process of 
intending can be suggested to be linked to distinct neural correlates 
in the brain (bottom box). The neural preparatory processes for action 
run from activity in higher cognitive areas to lower cognitive areas. 
dMPFC dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, RCZ rostral cingulate zone, 
SMA supplementary motor area, RP readiness potential, ERD event-
related desynchronization
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Soon et al. 2008). The current study suggests that the pro-
cess of intending develops during the process of acting, 
leaving traces in consciousness at certain points along the 
road, ultimately reaching awareness and becoming report-
able. More research is needed to validate the experimental 
designs of the Libet and Matsuhashi tasks and to differenti-
ate the neural processes relating to acting from those relat-
ing to intending and/or becoming conscious of intending. 
Our hope is that the currently emerging conceptual frame-
work for the process of intending will help to enable a more 
robust interpretation of research results and set the stage for 
new experiments.
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